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1   Introduction 
        Tick size is the minimum price variation allowance for stock quotations. On one hand, the 
discreteness in the bid-ask spread created by regulated tick size helps reduce both bargaining time and 
costs from potential execution errors. The downside of a regulated tick size is that it can drive a 
wedge between the true price and the actual transaction price, resulting in additional costs for 
investors. 
     
    Yet, markets around the world have adopted smaller tick sizes in an attempt to reduce transaction 
costs and promote trading activities. In 1994,  the Stock Exchange of Singapore (SES) reduced the 
minimum tick size for stocks that trade at and above SGD 25 from SGD 0.5 to SGD 0.10. The 
Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) introduced pure decimal pricing in 1996; a change from mixed 
decimal and fractional pricing. It also reduced the minimum tick for stocks traded at or above CAD 5 
from CAD 0.125 to CAD 0.05, and for those trading from CAD 3 to less than CAD 5 from CAD 0.05 
to CAD 0.01. The American Stock Exchange (AMEX) cut the minimum price increment from USD 
1/8 to USD 1/16 across the market in 1997 before introducing decimalization in early 2001. A line of 
empirical work evaluates the impact of these reductions on transaction costs and liquidity. The general 
  2finding is that reduction in price increment leads to lower bid-ask spreads and quotes while there is 
ambiguous impact on trading volume. 
     
    This paper evaluates of the impact of tick size reduction for the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) 
on bid-ask spreads, depths, and trading volume. The tick rule change was implemented on stocks that 
trade below THB 25 on November 5, 2001.
1 
 
While there is a growing list of studies on the impact of exogenous tick size changes, the 
unique structure of the Thai market, as well as the intraday disclosure of trader type, contributes to the 
literature in various important ways. First, the Thai market is dominated by retail investors who 
account for approximately 70% of total trades. Data from the Association of Thai Brokerages indicate 
that small retail accounts of less than THB 1 million (approximately USD 30,000) take up 88% of 
total brokerage account records and around 40% of retail trading volume. Since the Thai exchange is a 
limit order market where traders must compete to gain order precedence, we explore whether the 
more wealth-constrained retail investors, who are likely to be more sensitive to discreteness, are 
induced to provide more liquidity after tick reform. 
     
    Second, the tick rule change resulted in a very fine tick size schedule which classifies stocks into 
groups according to their price; each group with different minimum price increments. Additionally, 
retail trading participation is monotonically decreasing in price. This allows us to examine whether 
there is an association between the size of tick reduction and spread reduction, and whether the impact 
on depths and trading activities is uniform across different price steps and levels of retail trading 
participation. 
   
     
                                                 
1 For stocks trading  below THB 2, the tick size was cut from THB 0.1 to THB 0.01. For those trading trading 
from THB 2 to less than THB 5, and for those trading from THB 5 to less than THB 10, tick size was reduced 
from THB 0.1 to THB 0.02 and THB 0.05, respectively. The last group affected by the tick reform included 
stocks trading from THB 10 to less than THB 25. The tick size for this group was reduced from THB 0.25 to 
THB 0.1. 
  3    Our paper contributes to existing literature by providing empirical evidence that tick reduction on 
the Thai market, which is predominantly retail-based, yields similar results to those observed in 
markets elsewhere. That is, the study documents a fall in bid-ask spreads, market quotes and finds that 
tick reduction has no significant impact on the trading volume of stocks affected by the rule change. 
This corroborates with existing theories that reduction in tick size may not necessarily enhance 
trading activity given informational risk concerns and limited profitability when tick size is too small. 
Angel (1997) and Anshuman and Kalay (2002) note that a tick size that is too small may not be 
sufficient to compensate liquidity provision in presence of informed traders. Seppi (1997) and 
Cordella and Foucault (1999) produce models to convey these concerns and show that the optimal tick 
size should not be zero. The finding also supports existing empirical work. See for example, Ahn et al. 
(1996; 2002), and Goldstein and Kavajecz (2000), all of whom document declines in quoted depths 
following tick reductions.  The finding that tick size reduction has negative and significant impact on 
order exposure and no significant change in trading activity is likely due to two opposing effects. On 
the one hand, tick reduction helps reduce discreteness related costs and should induce more trading. 
On the other, smaller minimum price increments can discourage order exposure and hurt the 
profitability of limit order traders resulting in decreased liquidity demand and supply (see Harris, 
1991; 1994).  In this study, the profitability issue from price discreteness is likely to be more 
important than the information risk issue, particularly when we use a sample of liquid stocks with 
high visibility.  Furthermore, trading activities is concentrated among retail investors who are likely to 
have similar information and strategy sets.
2 
 
The key findings in this study are as follows. First, we find that the effect of tick reduction on 
bid-ask spreads varies across the tick size schedule. So far, there have been few studies on the effects 
of tick reduction across tick size schedules.
3  Our results show that the size of bid-ask spread 
reduction is related to the proportion of effective tick reduction as spread reduction is steepest for the 
group that receives the largest cut in relative tick size whereas spread reductions are much more 
                                                 
2 In terms of homogeneity of investors, stocks in the lowest price range in our study, i.e. those trading below 
THB 5 have over 90% retail type trading participation. 
3 Ahn et al. (2002) and Bourgelle and Declerck (2002) show the impact tick of reductions across different price 
range groups and tick schedules on the Japanese and French bourse, respectively. However, similar evidence 
from emerging markets where institutional structures are different, is limited. 
  4modest for groups that receive lower tick size cuts.
4 More specifically, we find that tick size reduction 
has been effective in reducing the bid-ask spreads for all stock groups, particularly for stocks priced 
below THB 2 and for those from THB 2 but less than THB 5, where the cost of trading, measured by 
reduction in quoted spread,  drops by THB 0.12 and THB 0.09 or by 57% and 32%, respectively. 
Reductions in quoted spreads for those with prices ranging from THB 5 to less than THB 10 and from 
THB 10 to less THB 25, are THB 0.05 and THB 0.15 or 13% and 18%, respectively. To confirm this 
relationship, we regress of the changes in spreads on changes in tick sizes controlling for changes in 
quoted depths, trading volume, and return standard deviation and find that the size of tick reduction 
has positive and significant impact on the size of bid-ask spread reduction.  
     
            Second, the study reveals that quoted depths (combined order flows at the best bid-ask prices), 
and market depths (combined order from entire limit order book) declined by 48% and 56%, 
respectively, subsequent to the split. At the same time, tick reduction shows no significant impact on 
trading volume. Although an increase in overall daily average volume is observed, this is mainly 
driven by the high daily average volume change of stocks trading from THB 10 to less than THB 25. 
The stocks in this group have relatively larger market capitalization and generally receive better 
trading interest. Outside this group, the daily average volume has, in fact, increased marginally. The 
cross-sectional regression indicates that it is indeed firm size, which proxies for stock price trading 
range, and not the reduction in tick size that leads to increased trading volume. 
 
Third, we find that tick reduction has not significantly increased the level of retail trading volume in 
the affected stock group, but has significantly increased the trading volume of foreign and local funds. 
However, the increases in foreign and local institutional trading activities are limited to the trading of 
stocks priced from THB 10 and less than THB 25, which have relatively higher market capitalization. 
In addition, the result indicates that the tick reduction has not been able to induce any clientele group 
                                                 
4 In a study of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE), Chung et al. (2005) find that stocks with larger 
mandatory tick sizes tend to have wider spreads. Like the SET, the KLSE is a limit order market that employs 
multiple tick sizes. Cai et al. (2008) studies the impact of tick size on spread on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, 
which also employs multiple tick size, but they focus only on endogenous tick changes from JPY 1 to JPY 10. 
Likewise, they find a positive association between tick size and spreads.   
  5to significantly increase their trading interest in stocks trading below THB 5, where the size of 
percentage tick reduction is largest.  
 
    The next part of the paper reviews the literature relevant to the significance of tick size. In Section 
3, we explain the market background and describe the data and data screening process. In Section 4, 
we describe the empirical methods used in this research and report the findings. Section 5 presents the 
conclusion. 
   
 
2   The Significance of Tick Size 
    The existence of minimum price variation can be both costly and beneficial. Large tick size creates 
an additional transaction burden for traders. For example, assume a stock is currently trading at THB 
20, a price at which the prevailing tick size is THB 0.25. Now, suppose public information arrives, 
which moves the new equilibrium price to THB 20.10 but the tick size remains THB 0.25. Only 
investors with a more extreme private valuation above THB 20.10 will be willing to buy at THB 
20.25. For those with an equilibrium valuation at THB 20.10, an additional discreteness-related 
commission of 0.74% (20.25-20.10/20.10) must be paid for acquiring the stock. But, if discreteness 
were the only cost that traders are concerned with, then a zero tick to eliminate dealers' rents should 
minimize trading costs and consequently induce more trading activities. 
     
    Despite placing additional costs, a minimum price variation requirement does provide benefits. 
Limit order traders gain compensation from minimum price variation for supplying liquidity and to 
cover adverse selection costs, as the important works of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Kyle (1985) 
have demonstrated. In addition, non-zero tick size makes front-running expensive for those who want 
to take advantage of exposed order flow. Bourgelle and Declerck (2001) show that an increase in tick 
size discourages the use of hidden orders on the Paris bourse. Others discuss the existence of an 
optimal tick size. Angel (1997) and Anshuman and Kalay (2002) both conclude that the optimal tick 
size must minimize investors' trading costs. But while Angel's model indicates that the optimal tick 
  6size is an increasing function of firms' market values and idiosyncratic risks, Anshuman and Kalay 
(2002) focus on the trade-off between adverse selection and discreteness related costs.  
 
    Liquidity traders in Anshuman and Kalay (2002) time their trades to occur in periods with high 
volume in order to reduce adverse selection and discreteness-related commissions. Therefore, a 
reduction in tick size may help cut transaction costs and boost trading volume but at the expense of 
lowering the profits of limit order investors as well as discouraging investors from exposing their 
orders. Seppi (1997) and Cordella and Foucault (1999) both show that the optimal tick size that 
minimizes trading cost must not be zero. In Seppi (1997), the relationship between tick size and 
liquidity is non-monotonic and discontinuous because both small and large investors have 
heterogeneous preferences about optimal tick size. The model shows that the optimal tick size for 
small investors is smaller than that for large investors because small investors can obtain priority at 
less cost. Cordella and Foucault (1999), use a model of sequential bidding to illustrate that a larger 
tick size helps raise the gap between competitive price and expected asset value, yielding greater 
profits. This encourages dealers' to post prices more quickly leading to faster price convergence that, 
in turn, reduces monitoring costs. 
     
    As suggested in Harris (1991) and Hollifield et al. (2004), quoted depth, which is the quantity bid 
or offered at the inside quote, is expected to decline along with tick size since large limit orders bear 
the risk of being "picked off" by informed traders seeking better quotes. For instance, Aitken et al. 
(2007) show that institutional investors tend to be much more aggressive in supplying liquidity.  
Besides the issue of picking-off risk, Lau and McInish (1995) notes that for normal demand and 
supply curves, the higher (lower) the purchase (sales) price for a higher (lower) bid (asks) the smaller 
the number of quotes.  Therefore, depth should decline when tick is reduced. 
     
    Since minimum price variation can be both costly and beneficial and that some optimal tick level 
exists, studies on the impact of tick reduction have tended to find that its impact on trading volume 
ambiguous. For example, Lau and McInish (1995) document a reduction in aggregate quoted size 
following tick reduction on the Singapore Exchange but cannot confirm an increase in trading 
  7volume. Ahn et al. (1996) make a similar conclusion for AMEX, Ahn et al. (2002) for the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange, and Chung et al. (2005) for KLSE. Others find that tick reduction lowers trading 
volume, for example, Chakravarty et al. (2004) in their study of decimalization on NYSE, and 
Bacidore (1997) in his study of decimalization of the Toronto Stock Exchange.  
     
    The impact of tick size on bid-ask spreads has more conclusive empirical evidence. Since the 
minimum bid-ask spread sets the lower bound for quoted bid-ask spreads, these two variables should 
be positively related (see Harris, 1994).
5 
 
Previous studies find that a reduction in tick size decreased bid-ask spreads significantly on 
the AMEX and the NYSE (Harris, 1994; Ahn et al. 1996; Goldstein and Kavajecz, 2000). 
Bessembinder (2003) finds similar evidence on the NASDAQ. Niemeyer and Sandas (1994) and Lau 
and McInish (1995) document a positive relationship between tick size and bid-ask spread on the 
Swedish and Singaporean markets, respectively. In a study of endogenous tick size changes, Cai et al. 
(2008) finds this relationship holds in the Japanese market as well. Table 1 summarizes the degree of 
spread decline from tick size reduction based on selected studies. These existing studies show clear 
support that tick reductions result in narrowed spreads but not in increased volume. 
 
 
3 The Stock Market in Thailand and Sample Data 
3.1 Market and Trading Background 
The Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) is a pure order driven market where traders are classified into 
four groups; retail, local institutional, brokerage, and foreign investors. Trading is largely based on an 
Automated Order Matching (AOM) system under strict price and time priority. Another system is 
referred to as a Put-Through (PT) system which supports trading from direct negotiation among 
dealers for themselves or on behalf of clients. A call market determines the opening and closing prices 
for the Exchange. There are two trading sessions on the SET, 10.00 am.-12.30 pm and 2.30 pm-4.30 
                                                 
5 To be more precise, tick size is binding for actively traded stocks. 
  8pm. The system continuously matches the first buy and sell orders in queue order and confirms 
transaction to the brokers' terminal. The three best bids and offers from the limit order books are 
available to the public on trading screens. 
     
    The SET is dominated by small retail investors as they typically account for up to 70% of total 
market daily trading volume. According to the Association of Thai Brokerages, 52% of the trading 
accounts at brokerages engage in trading of no more than THB 100,000 (approximately USD3,000) 
and 88% engage in trading of no more than THB 1 million (USD 30,000). All together these fairly 
small accounts make up around 70% of total retail trading volume. 
     
    The SET imposes multiple tick sizes on stocks in different price ranges as shown in Table 2. The 
tick rule change implemented on November 5, 2001 created ten stock groups based on their price 
range and minimum price grid as shown in Table 2. Prior to the change, there were only seven price 
grids as stocks trading below THB 10 all had the equivalent tick size of THB 0.1. After the new rule, 
stocks trading below THB 2 received the largest relative tick cut of 90% from THB 0.1 to THB 0.01. 
The relative tick reductions of those trading from THB 2 to less than THB 5, from THB 5 to less than 
THB 10, and from THB 10 to less than THB 25 are 80%, 50%, and 60%, respectively.  Analysis of 
trading activities by investor type indicates that retail clients favor stocks with small price 
denominations, whereas local fund managers and foreign investors prefer stocks with higher price 
ranges and market capitalization. As shown in Table 2, retail trading participation is monotonically 
decreasing in stock price levels.  
 
3.2 Data Description 
The SET provided the intraday dataset used in this study. The dataset consists of a limit order book 
file and a deal file. These files provide time-stamped order price, order volume, transaction price, 
transaction volume, order submission time, and transaction time of buyer and seller as well as trader 
identifiers. Traders are classified into brokerages, foreign, local funds, and retail. The rule change 
created a smaller minimum price grid for stocks below THB 25. As shown in Table 2, there are 10 
stock groups (Groups I-X) separated according to the minimum price rule. To be included in the 
  9sample, the stock must have at least three trades in every thirty-minute interval and must stay within 
the same tick price range from start to end of the study period (Oct 5, 2001 -Nov 30, 2001). This 
screening reduces the original file with 263 stocks to 93 stocks.
6 Only Groups I-IV, consisting of 79 
stocks in total, are affected by the rule change. The tick size of stocks that are lower than THB 2 
(Group I) is reduced by 90% from THB 0.1 to THB 0.01. The next group priced at THB 2 to less than 
THB 5 (Group II) received a reduction of 80% because the tick size is lowered from THB 0.1 to THB 
0.02. Group III (THB 5 to less than THB 10) and Group IV (THB 10 to less than THB 25) have tick 
sizes reduced by 60% to THB 0.05 and by 50% to THB 0.10, respectively.  
 
We use the stocks in Group V, consisting of 12 stocks priced from THB 25 to less than THB 50, 
which are not affected by the new rule implementation as our control sample. The four remaining 
stocks beyond this group trade at much higher price ranges and are thus less attractive candidates for 
comparisons. It is not possible to create a matched control group as average market capitalization per 
share and average daily trading volume per share tends to increase in price levels. For example, the 
average market capitalization of Group I and IV is THB 891 million, and THB 10,341 million, 
respectively. This leaves the 12 stocks in Group V, with average market capitalization of THB 20, 580 
million, as the best control sample available.  It is important to note that trading in the market is 
mostly concentrated in Group IV and Group V and that the median and average trading prices in the 
entire market are THB 11 and THB 26 fall in their trading range. 
 
We define the pre-event date as 20 trading days prior to the day of the rule change (October 5, 2001 - 
November 2, 2001)  and the post-event period as 20 trading days from the day of rule change 
(November 5, 2001 - November 30, 2001). A short event period is appropriate for our study because 
we need to avoid the end-of-year and turn-of-year trading effects and focus on the market's immediate 
response to the policy change. 
 
Table 3 shows the combined trading value of the "affected" sample stock group in our study is worth 
THB 1,643 million in 2001, accounting for almost 56% of total market trading. The trading value of 
                                                 
6 The use of this screening ensures that the spreads compiled in this paper are not stale and that we maintain a 
sample of stocks that have reasonable visibility and liquidity in the market.  
  10the control group sample was THB 310 million or approximately 11% of the total market trading 
value. Thus, the combined trading value of all stocks in the study sample is 67% of the total market 
trading value. The Wilcoxon rank sum test indicates that the trading volume and value of Groups IV 
and V has significantly increased after the tick rule change.  
     
    Figure 1 plots the SET index level and market trading volume from August 2001 to March 2002. 
The dotted lines indicate the sample period and the dark line marks the date of tick change 
implementation. The plot shows that the market takes off very strongly towards the end of the year 
and in the first few months of 2002, with the index rising to 378 by the end of March 2002 from 303 
at the beginning of December 2001. Trading volume also increased significantly after the rule change, 
especially during the first week of trading in January. The dramatic rise in market performance and 
subsequently in trading volume during the end of the year to the turn of the year justifies our short 
sample period as the rising market conditions are likely to produce a lower spread regardless of the 
tick rule change. Thus, to control for the effects of market performance on spreads, quotes, and 
trading volume, we use Group V as the control group for comparisons with affected groups. Figures 
2a-2d illustrate the price movement of each stock group with the market. For each group, an index 
based on an equal weight of relative price is created using the price index on October 5, 2001 as the 
base price. The pairwise correlation between each group price index and the market index is 0.68 
(Group I), 0.60 (Group II), 0.80 (Group III), and 0.90 (Group IV). Similarly, the pairwise correlation 
between each group's trading volume and the market trading volume is between 0.48 for Group I and 
0.88 for Group IV.   
 
     
4 Empirical  Findings 
In this section, we first analyze the consequence of tick size on spreads, depths, and volume 
of stocks with different price ranges and minimum price variations using intergroup analysis whereby 
the “affected” group is compared to the control group 
 
 
  114.1 Intergroup  comparisons 
    In a limit order market like the SET, most transactions occur at either the outstanding bid or ask; 
therefore the quoted spread, which is simply the difference between ask and bid, is the key measure of 
trading costs. Nevertheless, to account for the few stray executions that occur inside the bid-ask 
spread, we also compute the effective spread, which is defined as 2|p-q| where p is the transaction 
price and q is the midpoint derived from (bid+ask)/2. To compute the effective spread, we made sure 
that there is both bid and ask outstanding prior to the transaction price. We then obtain the percentage 
quoted spread and percentage effective spread by dividing the quoted spread and effective spread by 
the mid-point.  The spreads are computed using all transaction data available. In each half hour of 
trading, the average spread is computed. The half-hour averages are then used to obtain daily averages 
over the period of interest, i.e. before rule change (pre-event) and after rule change (post-event). 
     
    The spread information is provided in Panel A of Table 4. As expected, the quoted spread and 
percentage quoted spread decline significantly for all groups. The degree of reduction is in the order 
of tick size change (see Table 2). Subsequent to relative tick size reduction of 90% and 80%, the 
percentage quoted spreads of Group I and Group II are down by 49% and 27%. On the other hand, the 
spreads of Group III and Group IV decline more moderately by, 14% and 19%, following 50% and 
60% reductions in relative spreads, respectively. This result suggests an increasing and convex 
relationship between relative tick size reduction and relative spreads. To test the hypothesis that there 
is no difference between pre-event and post-event spreads, the non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sum 
test is used. As shown, the Wilcoxon test statistics indicate significant changes for quoted spreads of 
each group relative to pre-event changes as well as relative to control group quoted spreads and 
percentage quoted spreads. The savings for all stock groups in monetary terms are provided in Panel 
B of Table 4. To estimate the extent of financial savings from transaction cost reduction, we compute 
the difference between post-event and pre-event transaction costs. For each period, the transaction 
cost is estimated by multiplying the half quote spread by average daily trading volume after the tick 
change, the number of stocks within the group, and the number of trading days. For example, the total 
transaction costs (without brokerage fees and taxes) borne by investors trading in Group I before the 
rule change is approximately THB 38.7 million [(0.21/2)·9·20·2,055,270] using the average spread 
  12before the rule change and the daily trading volume after the rule change. Using the new spread, the 
total transaction costs for Group I, II, III, and IV fall by approximately THB 22 million (57%), THB 
43 million (32%), THB 31 million (13%) and THB 71 million (18%), respectively. 
 
           In Panel A of Table 5, we report various measures of depths and trading activities before and 
after the rule change of the affected group and the control group. The reduction in quotations to trades 
for the tick change for all groups suggests that traders use more hidden orders over the sample period. 
We also find that quoted and market depths of the affected group declined,   whereas quoted and 
market depths of with the control group increased over the same period. The reduction in quoted 
depths is consistent with predictions in Harris (1991) and Lau and McInish (1995). Although not 
shown, the decline in depth is particularly significant for Groups I and II because they experience 
more substantial percentage tick reductions, which implies greater percentage reductions in dealing 
profit and relatively larger monitoring costs for investors. There is no significant improvement in 
trading volume of the affected group as a whole. Despite the notable percentage increase in trading 
volume documented for the entire group, this increase is mainly driven by large daily average volume 
of stocks in Group IV. Outside this group, average daily trading volume increased only marginally. 
Consequently, the Wilcoxon rank sum test statistics show that the trading volume change of the 
affected group as a whole is insignificant. In contrast, the control group experienced both statistically 
significant improvements in depth and average daily volume over the same period. 
 
Panel B of Table 5 provides statistics on depths and trading activities of stocks in the affected group 
by clientele type.  It shows that retail investors, foreigners, and local institutions, reduced the amount 
of order submissions evident from the significant declines in quoted and market depths by around 
40%-50%.  Although there is no significant change in retail investors’ daily trading volume, there are 
significant increases in the average daily trading volume of foreign and local institutional investors.  
The average daily trading volume of foreign and local institutional investors rose by 80% and 118%, 
respectively. Yet the increase in institutional investors’ average daily trading volume is not sufficient 
to raise the overall volume of the affected group since their increased participation is actually only 
  13limited to the larger stocks in Group IV. By and large, retail investors still dominate all trading 
segments and their average daily trading volume at a more modest rate of 32%. 
 
4.2  Cross-sectional analysis  
    For better assessment of the impact of tick change on spread, depth, and trading volume, we run 
multivariate cross-sectional regressions and report the results in Table 6. The regressions are 
estimated using both the OLS and 2SLS methods to account for endogeneity between spread and 
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    where: 
 
  DBASi    =        the change in average posted percentage bid ask spread between pre-  
                and post-event periods 
  DTICKi   =        the change in relative tick between pre- and post-event periods,  
                where relative tick is tick divided by the average transaction price 
DLNQDi   =        the natural log of post- to pre-event daily average quoted depth ratio 
                 of each stock 
DLNVOLi          =   the natural log of post- to pre-event daily average trading volume     
ratio   of each stock 
DNOTRANSi     =   the natural log of post- to pre-event daily retail transactions of each 
stock 
 
  14DSTDi     =        the percentage change in average standard deviation computed from  
                the square root of daily return variance in each period 
LNMVi    =        the natural log of average pre-event market capitalization 
 
The vector of residuals e1, e2, and e3 are obtained from regressions of the dependent variables on the 
fitted values of the endogenous variables, and other explanatory variables. The t-stats reported are 
based on corrected standard errors. 
 
    The rationale for the selection of variables in the three regressions above has foundation from 
Harris (1994). Similar forms of estimation are used in Ahn et al. (2002), and Niemeyer and Sandas 
(1994), among others. In equation (1), the change in posted relative spread is determined by the 
change in tick size because tick size forms the lower bound for spreads. Changes in quote sizes, 
volume, and number of retail transactions, which are measures of trading activities, are expected to be 
related to spreads. We expect quotes and spreads to move together whereas spreads and volume 
should have an inverse relationship. The number of retail transactions is also included as an 
explanatory variable as retail investors are dominant in this market and their response to tick change 
may have an affect on bid-ask spreads. Return standard deviation measures idiosyncratic risk and the 
degree of asymmetric information; thus, the higher the return volatility, the higher the bid-ask spreads.  
 
Equation (2) attempts to capture how the change in minimum price variation will affect quote sizes. 
The change in bid-ask spreads can also have an endogenous impact on quotes. The change in trading 
volume and firm size help control for firm characteristics. Return volatility captures price uncertainty 
and thus should be inversely related to the quote size.  
 
In equation (3), we examine how a change in the natural log of volume is affected by tick reform after 
controlling for changes in quote size and firm size.  As noted earlier in Table 2, firm size is a proxy 
for a firm’s general price range and hence a good proxy to control for investors’ preferred trading 
range. As firm size or market capitalization can change due to variation in price levels from news 
events, we use the pre-event firm size level to control for the firms' general price characteristics. 
  15Using a window period of only 40 days, there is very small variation in firm size, and so we adopt the 
pre-event firm size in our regression for better estimation properties.  
     
      Table 6 reports the regression results of the three equations. Both OLS and 2SLS regressions 
deliver similar results. In equation (1), the change in tick size, quoted depth, and volatility has positive 
and significant impact on bid-ask spreads. A 1% reduction in relative tick (quoted depth) leads to 
around 0.2% (2%) reduction in relative quoted spreads, whereas a 1% decrease in return volatility 
leads relative bid-ask spreads to drop 0.1%.  
     
    Equation (2), shows positive association between change in bid-ask spreads and change in quotes 
and a negative association between and return volatility and change in quotes. However, the 
relationship between return volatility and change in quotes is not significant in the 2SLS.  
     
   In equation (3), where the dependent variable is the change in trading volume, we find that 
neither tick change nor the percentage quote change has significant economic or statistical impact. On 
the contrary, a 1% change in firm size leads to a 0.01% increase in trade volume. This result concurs 
with existing empirical work that finds tick reduction has no impact on volume. However, in this case, 
it is firm size which proxies for general firm characteristics and price levels, that turns out to be a 
major driver of volume changes.    
 
As a robustness check, we re-estimate all regressions (OLS and 2SLS) by adding group dummies (D2, 
D3, and D4) for Group II, III, and IV in equations (1), (2), and (3) and then by excluding penny stocks 
in Group I.  Our conclusions remain unchanged in both cases.  
 
In sum, the findings from these regressions confirm that tick size reduction has a significant affect in 
reducing bid-ask spreads.  There is clearly a strong positive relationship between bid-ask spreads and 
quoted depth. From the regressions, we do not find that changes in tick size and quoted depth have 
significant associations with volume change.  
 
  16 5   Conclusion 
The intraday data set from the Thai Exchange, provides client identification by type- retail, local 
institutional, brokerage, and foreign investors. This feature of the data set allows us to examine not 
only how minimum price variation change can affect trading activities, but also allows us to explore 
how different clientele respond to such change. The dominance of retail traders in a limit order market 
like the Thai Exchange makes the study interesting as retail investors are expected to react favorably 
to tick reduction as they are likely to be more sensitive to discreteness related costs. 
 
Yet our study finds that the impact of tick reduction on the Thai market is similar to other markets 
where institutional investors have more dominance.  The study finds that tick reduction leads to a 
declines in spreads and quotes while having no significant impact on trading volume. As a matter of 
fact, the reduction in tick size has no significant impact on retail investors’ trading activities. 
Consistent with the theoretical predictions of Cordella and Foucault (1999), reducing tick size can 
have adverse consequences on quotes and volume. In a market with sequential bidding like the Thai 
Exchange, quotes can drop as consequence of tick reduction because trading profits are reduced and 
monitoring costs are increased.   
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Figure 1: SET Index and Market Volume 
 
This figure plots the daily SET index on the left-hand scale and daily market trading volume in millions of shares on the 
right-hand scale. The dark line marks November 5, 2001, the day of the tick rule change while the dotted lines mark the 
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Figure 2: SET Index and Equal Weighted Price Index by Group 
 
The left-hand scale of the following figures plots the SET index and the equal weighted price index for each stock 
group for the sample period October 5 – November 30, 2001. The dark line marks November 5, 2001, the date of the 
tick rule change. Both indices are scaled such that the base price is on October 5. Each stock group is classified 
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                  Figure 2c: Group 3                                                   Figure 2d: Group 4 
      
 






  21Table 1: Selected Empirical Studies on Tick Rule Changes   
 
This table documents the impact of tick rule change on quoted spreads and share volume from selected existing works 
on the AMEX, Euronext Paris, NASDAQ, NYSE, Singapore Stock Exchange, Tokyo Stock Exchange and Toronto 
Stock Exchange.   
 
 
Market Source  Quoted  Spread 
% Quote 
spread %  Tick 
Impact on 
      change in local ccy  change  change  Share Vol 
AMEX   Ahn et al. (1996)  (in cents)     Unchanged 
USD 1- USD 5 stocks     -1.71  -9%  -50%   
USD 5- USD 10 stocks    0.01  0%     
          
Euronext Paris  Bourgelle and       Unchanged 
CAC 40  Declerck (2002)  na  -0.0027% -0.05%   
SBF 250    na  -0.0231% -0.05%   
         
NASDAQ  Bessimbinder (2002)  (in cents)     
Large cap stocks    -5.55  57%  -84%**  NA 
Medium cap stocks    -4.68  27%  -84%  NA 
Small cap stocks    -2.11  8%  -84%  NA 
          
NYSE  Chakravarty, Wood,   (in cents)      
Quintile 1 Volume (Lowest)  and Van Ness (2004)  -4.1  -23%  -84%**  -69% 
Quintile 2 Volume    -4.76  -29%  -84%  -64% 
Quintile 3 Volume     -5.87  -36%  -84%  -67% 
Quintile 4 Volume    -5.45  -43%  -84%  -70% 
Quintile 5 Volume (Highest)   -4.84  -40%  -84%  -66% 
          
Singapore Stock Exchange*  Lau and McInish  (in S$)     Unchanged 
Above SGD 25  (1995)  -0.54  -72%  -80%   
          
Tokyo Stock Exchange  Ahn et al. (2002)  (in yen)     Unchanged 
JPY 101 – JPY 1,000 stocks    0.23  4%  -   
JPY 1,001 -  JPY 2,000 stocks    -4.90  -28%  -90%   
JPY 2,001 – JPY 3,000 stocks    -4.24  -19%  -50%   
JPY 3,001 – JPY 10,000 stocks    -1.88  -5%  -   
JPY 10,001 – JPY 30,000 stocks     -73.83  -46%  -90%   
          
Toronto Stock Exchange  Bacidore (1997)  (in cents)     
CAD 3 -5 Not Cross listed    0.76  9%  - 80%  -17% 
> CAD 5 Not cross-listed    - 3.8  -20%  -60%  -7% 
> CAD 5 Cross-listed    -3.7  -27%  -60%  1% 
          
*Average across stock group, authors' computation 








  22Table 2: Tick Size Schedule 
 
This table displays the minimum price variation for stocks in different price ranges before and after tick reform on November 5, 2001.  The number of stocks in each group 
represents the post-screening sample that must have at least 3 trades every 30 minute interval. The total number of sample firms in the tick change sample is  79. The number 









Value/shr  % Retail  Number of  




(THB)  reduction   (THB mil.) 
 
(THB mil.)  participation  common stocks 
I  Lower than THB 2  0.1  0.01  90%         891   5  93% 9 
II  From THB 2 but lower than THB 5  0.1  0.02  80%      1,853   16  91% 19 
III  From THB 5 but lower than THB10  0.1  0.05  50%      2,545   24  87% 23 
IV  From THB 10 but lower than THB25  0.25  0.1  60%    10,341   27  83% 28 
V  From THB 25 but lower than THB 50  0.25  0.25  None    20,580   26  80% 12 
VI  From THB 50 but lower than THB 100  0.5  0.5  None      2,964   17  75% 2 
VII  From THB 100 but lower than THB 200  1  1  None    36,204   72  67% 2 
VIII  From THB 200 but lower than THB 400  2  2  None  None  None  None None 
IX  From THB 400 but lower than THB 800  4  4  None  None  None  None None 
X Above  THB  800  6  6  None  None  None  None None 












  23Table 3: Sample Characteristics: Tick Size, Trading, and Clientele Participation 
 
This table shows the contribution of each stock group’s average daily trading volume (millions of shares) and value 
(millions of THB) and  as percentage of total market before and after tick rule change.  Define “before” as 20 trading 
days before the rule change (October  5-November 2, 2001) and “after” as 20 trading days after the rule change 




   Year total  Before  After  p-value 
   Jan 2- Dec 28  Oct 5-Nov 2  Nov 5-Nov 30  Wilcoxon 
Group I        
Trading Volume (mil. shares)  21.31  12.77  18.50  0.030 
% of market  8.08  7.76  5.68  0.005 
Trading Value (THB mil.)  48.79  18.31  26.02  0.042 
% of market  1.67  1.27  0.88  0.829 
 Group II      
Trading Volume (mil. shares)  60.35  37.03  47.46  0.245 
% of market  22.87  22.51  14.58  0.000 
Trading Value (THB mil.)  294.65  123.88  158.30  0.465 
% of market  10.06  8.56  5.37  0.008 
 Group III      
Trading Volume (mil. shares)  61.27  59.90  62.66  0.871 
% of market  23.23  36.41  19.25  0.000 
Trading Value (THB mil.)  562.80  420.54  459.79  0.871 
% of market  19.22  29.07  15.61  0.000 
 Group  IV      
Trading Volume (mil. shares)  39.46  14.83  47.05  0.014 
% of market  14.96  9.02  14.45  0.371 
Trading Value (THB mil.)  736.40  223.92  752.46  0.016 
% of market  25.14  15.48  25.54  0.019 
 Group V (Control)      
Trading Volume (mil. shares)  8.68  4.41  8.28  0.007 
% of market  3.29  2.68  2.54  0.001 
Trading Value (THB mil.)  310.20  151.14  277.09  0.009 
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Table 4: Quoted Spread and Effective Spread Before and After Tick Rule Change 
 
Panel A of the table reports quoted spreads and effective spreads in THB terms and in percentages by stock group 20 
trading days before and after the tick rule change.  Define “before” as 20 trading days before the rule change (October  
5-November 2, 2001) and “after” as 20 trading days after the rule change (November 5, - November 30, 2001). The 
Wilcoxon rank sum test is used for assessing differences in distribution of spreads before and after tick rule change and 
the post-event differences in distribution of the affected group and the control group. *, **, and ***  denotes 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.  Panel B reports the transaction cost savings from spread reduction. This is 
derived from multiplying the half quote spread by the number of stocks in each group, the number of trading days, and 
the average daily share volume after the tick rule change. 
 
Panel A: Quoted spreads and effective spreads by stock group 
  
      Before After %  Change 
Post- event  % 
Change 
      Oct 5-Nov 2  Nov 5-Nov 30  (After-Before)  (Affected-Control) 
Group I  Quoted Spread (THB)  0.21  0.09  -57%***  -93%*** 
  % Quoted spread  15.44  7.93  -49%***  101%*** 
 Effective  Spread  0.10  0.06  -36%***  -93%*** 
  % Effective Spread  7.47  5.47  -27%***  110%*** 
          
Group II  Quoted Spread (THB)  0.28  0.19  -32%***  -86%*** 
  % Quoted spread  8.5  6.19  -27%***  57%*** 
  Effective Spread  0.11  0.1  -9%  -89%*** 
  % Effective Spread  3.57  3.33  -7%  28%*** 
          
Group III  Quoted Spread (THB)  0.39  0.34  -13%***  -74%*** 
  % Quoted spread  5.45  4.71  -14%***  19%** 
  Effective Spread  0.15  0.19  27%***  -78%*** 
  % Effective Spread  2.11  2.78  32%**  6%** 
          
Group IV  Quoted Spread (THB)  0.85  0.7  -18%***  -47%*** 
  % Quoted spread  5.62  4.58  -19%***  16%** 
 Effective  Spread  0.42  0.4  -5%  -54%*** 
  % Effective Spread  2.73  2.63  -4%  1% 
          
Group V  Quoted Spread (THB)  1.41  1.33  -6%  na 
(Control)  % Quoted spread  4.15  3.95  -5%  na 
 Effective  Spread  0.88  0.87  -1%  na 
   % Effective Spread  2.55  2.61  2%  na 
 *, **, and ***  Indicates significance levels at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Panel B: Transaction cost savings from spread reduction 
 
Group 
Cost with old 
spread 
Cost with new 
spread  Savings  % Change  Cost savings as 
   (THB '000)  (THB '000)  (THB'000)  (After-Before)  % of Mkt Cap 
Group I  38,659.63  16,740.17  21,919.45  -56.70%  2.46% 
Group II  133,022.34  90,265.16  42,757.18  -32.14%  2.31% 
Group III  244,843.33  213,453.16  31,390.17  -12.82%  1.23% 
Group IV  403,267.20  332,102.40  71,164.80  -17.65%  0.69% 
 Table 5: Depths and Trading Activities Before and After Tick Reform 
 
Panel A of the table reports depth (order at best bid-ask price), market depth (combined order from entire limit order book) in terms of volume (shares) and value (THB), and 
average trading activity for each group. All units are in thousands of shares for volume and in thousands of THB for value except for the ratio “quotations to trades” which 
measures outstanding market depth to trading value.  Define “before” as 20 trading days before the rule change (October  5-November 2, 2001) and “after” as 20 trading days 
after the rule change (November 5, - November 30, 2001). The Wilcoxon rank sum test is used for assessing differences in distribution of spreads before and after tick rule 
change. *, **, and ***  denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Panel B reports the same set of statistics separated by investor type. Investors are classified into 
retail, foreign, and local institutions (funds and brokerages). 
 
Panel A: Depths and trading activities of affected stock group 
 
Unit in thousands  Affected Group  Affected Group    Control Group  Control Group    Affected Group  Control Group 
  Before After    Before After    % Change  % Change 
   Oct 5-Nov 2  Nov 5-Nov 30    Oct 5-Nov 2  Nov 5-Nov 30    (After-Before) (After-Before) 
Depth Volume   691.71  358.87    55.80 70.62    -48%*** 27%** 
Depth Value   3,869.45  2,354.19    1,831.68 2,339.10    -39%*** 28%*** 
Market Depth Volume  2,496.51  1,086.46    297.11 402.85    -56%*** 36%** 
Market Depth Value  14,826.71  7,606.45    9,879.16 13,313.10    -49%*** 35%** 
              
Avg Daily Trading 





Avg Daily Trading Value  8,718.31  14,587.30    12,594.59 23,091.05    67% 83%*** 
              
Quotations to trades  0.53  0.23    0.92 0.71    -56%*** -23%** 
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Table 5: Depth and Trading Activity Before and After Tick Reform (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Depths and trading activities of affected group by investor type 
 
Investor  Unit in thousands  Affected Group  Affected Group  % Change 
Type    
Before  
Oct 5-Nov 2 
After 
 Nov 5-Nov 30  (After-Before) 
Retail  Depth Volume   619.33  322.03  -48%*** 
  Depth Value   3,306.24  1,970.12  -40%*** 
  Market Depth Volume  2,262.09  981.94  -57%*** 
  Market Depth Value  13,046.13  6,516.34  -50%*** 
        
  Avg Daily Trading Volume  1,461.23  1,935.35  32% 
  Avg Daily Trading Value  7,627.84  12,117.18  59% 
        
  Quotations to trades  0.54  0.25  -54%*** 
        
Foreign  Depth Volume   48.34  22.73  -53%*** 
  Depth Value   348.49  223.51  -36%*** 
  Market Depth Volume  156,446.89  66,342.31  -58%*** 
  Market Depth Value  1,082,407.01  661,569.41  -39%*** 
        
  Avg Daily Trading Volume  124.50  221.36  78%*** 
  Avg Daily Trading Value  814.85  1,792.82  120%*** 
        
  Quotations to trades  0.48  0.13  -73%*** 
        
Funds & Broker  Depth Volume   24.04  14.12  -41%** 
  Depth Value   214.72  160.56  -25%* 
  Market Depth Volume  77,980.26  38,172.01  -51%*** 
  Market Depth Value  698,173.80  428,545.30  -39%** 
        
  Avg Daily Trading Volume  40.41  88.21  118%*** 
  Avg Daily Trading Value  275.62  677.30  146%*** 
   Quotations to trades  0.75  0.24  -68%*** 
 Table 6:  Cross Sectional Regressions of Changes in Spread, Depth, and Trading Volume 
 
The following reports coefficients from the OLS and 2SLS regressions.  The dependent variables in equations  (1), (2), 
and (3) are changes in percentage bid-ask spreads (DBAS), the natural log of post- to pre-event daily average quoted 
depth ratio (DLNQD), and the natural log of post- to pre-event daily average volume ratio (DLNVOL).  To account for 
endogeneity between spread and depth , in equations (1) and (2)  DTICK, DLNVOL, the natural log of post-to-pre 
number of retail transactions (DNTRANS), change in standard deviation (DSTD), are used as instrumental variables. 
To estimate equation (3), DTICK, DBAS, and the natural log of pre-event market capitalization (LNMV) are used as 
instrumental variables.  The t-stats reported are based on corrected standard errors. 
 
 
                                   
Dependent var  OLS  2SLS 
DBAS   Estimate  t Value  Estimate  t Value 
DTICK  0.211***  3.33 0.180** 2.05 
DLNQD  2.304*** 3.01  2.314  1.98** 
DLNVOL  -0.045 -0.05 -0.459 -0.42 
DNTRANS  0.038 0.75 0.044 0.71 
DSTD  0.111*** 4.51 0.140*** 2.66 
Adj Rsq  0.403    0.284   
Dependent var  OLS  2SLS 
DLNQD   Estimate  t Value  Estimate  t Value 
DTICK  -0.009 -0.78 -0.031 -0.91 
DBAS  0.048*** 3.01  0.142  1.97** 
DLNVOL  0.058 0.51 0.018 0.12 
LNMV  0.003 0.82 0.003 0.73 
DSTD  -0.010** -2.42  -0.018 -1.26 
Adj Rsq  0.152    0.033   
Dependent var  OLS  2SLS 
DLNVOL  Estimate t  Value Estimate t  Value 
DTICK 0.002  0.19  -0.003  -0.23 
DLNQD 0.113  0.98  -0.461  -0.79 
LNMV  0.009***  2.92 0.013** 2.39 
Adj Rsq  0.138    0.098   
                                  *, **, *** Indicates significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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